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CO-LOCATION, CO-LOCATION, CO-LOCATION:
LAND USE AND HOUSING PRIORITIES REIMAGINED
Lee Anne Fennell*†
INTRODUCTION
It is a great honor to deliver the Norman Williams lecture, and I
appreciate you all choosing to co-locate yourselves here with me this
evening. Everyone knows the three most important factors in choosing a
home: location, location, location. In my talk today, I hope to convince you
that’s not quite right. What matters most when it comes to housing is not
location, in the sense of a geographic map point, but rather co-location, or a
home’s position relative to other land uses and land users.1 This elaboration
might seem obvious and trivial, but it turns out to matter a great deal, and in
ways that have not been fully recognized. Taking co-location seriously
changes the way we think about land use possibilities and priorities. And it
can transform our thinking about housing.
This talk comes in three steps. First, I want to explain what I mean by
co-location, and why it matters—not just in dense urban centers but also in
small towns, rural and agricultural areas, and even in places of great natural
beauty like Vermont. Next, I will articulate some land use principles that
follow from recognizing the primacy of co-location. Finally, I will offer
some specific policy approaches that can leverage the power of co-location.
I. WHAT IS CO-LOCATION AND WHY DO WE CARE?
Let’s start with a thought experiment. Picture your house or apartment
or condo. Think about the boundaries of your property holding, the edges of
what the law says you own. Now imagine someone with a giant eraser
comes along and removes every man-made element within a fifty-mile
* Max Pam Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. A number of the ideas
explored in this lecture have been developed in my prior and forthcoming work. See, e.g., Lee Anne
Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1977–78 (2012); Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama,
2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming). The text of the lecture has been modified slightly for publication and
sources have been added. For helpful comments, questions, and conversations, I thank John Echeverria,
William Fischel, Marc Mihaly, Sean Nolon, Melissa Scanlon, Kinvin Wroth, and the lecture attendees.
I am grateful for financial support from the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan and Harold J. Green Faculty
Funds and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.
† 10th Annual Norman Williams Lecture in Land Use Planning and the Law, April 9, 2014.
1. For other recent treatments focusing on the significance of co-location, see, e.g., David
Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1509–10, 1515–29
(2010); Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637
(2012).
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radius of your home’s property boundaries. Everything that used to be
there—schools, restaurants, auto dealerships, ski resorts, your neighbors’
houses, this building, the roads, the sidewalks, the parking lots, all of it—is
now gone. This eraser also subtracts the populations that go with all those
land uses. Something very profound has happened to your home, even
though nothing within the boundaries of your property has been touched,
and your house remains rooted in the same physical location.
The point is simple: The structure and parcel is not your home, in an
important sense. Your home encompasses a profusion of elements that
surround the property itself and affect its value.2 Location only has meaning
to the extent that we make assumptions about what is happening in the
adjacent areas. This seems obviously true in urban centers like Chicago.
Economists speak of agglomeration benefits that come from getting lots of
people and ideas and products and services and employment opportunities
all together in one place.3 We thus tend to associate the benefits of colocation with the energy and excitement of a dense big city, but the point is
a much more general one.4
Consider a place like Vermont, with beautiful natural features. It might
seem that a home’s value in such a place is mostly about geographic
location relative to natural features like mountain ranges. To put it in my
terms, you might say that the only co-location that matters is co-location
with the mountains, and the mountains aren’t going anywhere. But think
again about the value that is added by mountains, such as scenic vistas and
recreational opportunities. The ability to enjoy the mountains depends on
the right mix of access to them and protection of them—and the way that
mix is managed comes down to who and what is nearby. Are there ski
resorts? How intensively developed? How about the neighbors? How many
are there? Occupying what structures? Are they here year-round or
seasonally? What restaurants and shops are nearby? Who works in them,
and where do they live? And what about transportation infrastructure, the
roads that get you up and down and through the mountains?

2. See generally LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME (2009).
3. See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IV.X.7–13 §3 (8th ed. 1920),
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html; EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES,
AGGLOMERATION, AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 6–8, 117 (2008); see also Schleicher, supra note 1, at
1509–10, 1515–29 (providing an overview of the legal and economic literature relating to
agglomeration).
4. Although agglomeration economics focuses on the benefits (and costs) of clustering
together in cities and urban areas, the broader point is about putting together complementary elements in
time and space. See infra Part II.A.
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So regardless of what kind of setting we’re talking about, land use is
highly interdependent, and co-location is the primary concern. Each use
generates its own mix of benefits and detriments for the surrounding area,
and—as long as it’s there—blocks innumerable other possible uses of the
same land, for better or worse. The law is always intensely involved in
mediating, channeling, and controlling co-location, even if it is not doing so
explicitly. Can it do better?
Historically, land use law has focused on addressing land use conflicts.
Land use conflicts are fundamentally co-location problems. Consider
Sturges v. Bridgman, a classic co-location fail that was explored by Ronald
Coase in his groundbreaking paper, The Problem of Social Cost.5 Dr.
Sturges decided to add a consulting room to the back of his property.
Bridgman was a confectioner whose candy-making operations created
vibrations that disturbed Sturges’s practice.6 Either use would be fine on its
own, or combined with innumerable other uses, but this specific
combination was problematic. The court ruled for the doctor, finding the
confectioner’s operations were a nuisance.7 Even though those operations
would not be a nuisance in all times and places, they became one here,
given the added ingredient of the physician’s office. The idea of
problematic combinations is a recurring theme in land use law. Justice
Sutherland, writing for the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty, the case upholding the constitutionality of zoning, put it this way:
“A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,—like a pig in
the parlor instead of the barnyard.”8 There’s nothing wrong with the pig in
the abstract or the parlor in the abstract, it’s the combination, the colocation, that causes trouble.
Co-location is not always about conflict, even though that’s where the
law has usually focused its attention. It is true that breaking apart
incompatible uses can increase value. But so too can putting together uses
that complement and benefit each other. Indeed, co-location is what gives
housing most of its value. Fostering patterns of complementary uses that
produce positive synergies is as an important a project for the law as
keeping apart uses that conflict with each other.9 That’s true whether we are
5. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8–10 (1960) (citing and
discussing Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (Eng. 1879)).
6. Id. at 8–9 (citing Sturges, 11 Ch. D. at 852–53).
7. Id. at 9 (citing Sturges, 11 Ch. D. at 859).
8. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
9. This point has been emphasized in recent legal scholarship on agglomeration economies.
See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 214–20, 236–60, 246–60 (2012) (focusing on the significance of positive
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talking about creating lively urban districts or preserving habitats or
sustainably developing natural or rural areas. These two projects—
separating conflicts and putting together complements—blend into each
other: A use can be in the wrong place not only when it has negative
spillovers for its neighbors, but also when it impedes putting together a
cluster or chunk of uses that will together generate more value.10 The “pig
in the parlor” might be a road that breaks up a wildlife corridor or a vacant
lot in the middle of an area that is striving for vibrancy.
II. CO-LOCATION LAND USE PRINCIPLES
How does a focus on co-location change our thinking about land use? I
will suggest three ways in which it does so. First, it reminds us that
“chunks”—packages of complementary uses—matter. Second, it focuses
attention on the importance of coordinating land uses to achieve valuable
chunks. Finally, it highlights the real problem at the heart of the most
interesting and difficult land use conflicts: that producing some chunks of
value requires breaking apart others.11
A. Chunks Matter
A focus on co-location prompts us to consider how combinations of
uses and users produce value. Or, to put it more simply, it impresses upon
us that chunks matter. Consider a bridge, and how it produces value.
Suppose you have a chasm that is ten bridge-segments long. How do the
segments generate value? Well, you need the whole bridge. Nine segments
is next to worthless, except as unusual urban art, or possibly for filming
chase scenes involving airborne cars. For most of us, a partial bridge is not
a useful thing at all. A bridge is a standard example of what economists call
a “lumpy good.”12
externalities for cities and discussing one approach for addressing them). Legal interventions may not
always be necessary to produce these complementary patterns, however; private coordination may
suffice in some cases. See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 656–62.
10. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming); Ronit
Levine-Schnur, Agreements Between Local Governments and Private Entrepreneurs as a Means for
Urban Development 43–54, 157–66 (Aug. 2014) (unpublished dissertation, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem) (on file with author).
11. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1977–78 (2012)
(giving the example of cotenancy partition actions in which either a spatial or temporal lump of value
must be broken apart).
12. See, e.g., Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative
Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982) (describing goods that can be
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Some land uses are like this. When you want a highway or a railroad, it
won’t do to have missing segments. This is pretty well understood, and it’s
a key reason we have eminent domain.13 But what if you have a portion of a
city that just isn’t very lively right now and you want to make it so? What
will it take? Maybe you need a critical mass of shops, a certain amount of
variety, before the area really starts to generate foot traffic and interest. The
same is true for things like habitat preservation. If larger chunks of habitat
facilitate more activity within the preserved area by reducing the
disruptions associated with edges, the goal cannot simply be to preserve X
total acres of habitat—the configuration matters.14 We might say something
similar about a community or a neighborhood, where the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts. The question is an empirical one, but perhaps
value among nearby households tends to grow over time, so that breaking
up a longstanding neighborhood is especially damaging.15
B. Coordination Matters
A corollary of the idea that chunks matter is the point that coordination
matters. Here is a concrete example to illustrate, borrowed from Robert
Ellickson and Vicki Been’s land use casebook.16 Imagine an area filled with
vineyards that would be more valuable shifted to residential use—but only
if the shift is total.17 Moving a few vineyards into residential use turns out
to be a terrible idea. You’d have isolated houses without the necessary
infrastructure, and they’d break up the landscape that was previously given
over to vineyards. Houses spoil the atmosphere for vineyard tours and the
provided “only in more or less massive ‘lumps’”); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 59 (1982)
(noting and qualifying the example of a bridge as a “single-step good[]”).
13. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61
(1986).
14. See, e.g., Todd G. Olson et al., The Habitat Transaction Method: A Proposal for Creating
Tradable Credits in Endangered Species Habitat, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 27, 28–30 (Hank Fischer & Wendy Hudson eds., 1994) (presenting the
“habitat transaction method” which takes into account the shape and contiguity of “habitat patches”);
see generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs,
32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2007) (noting spatial and temporal differentiation among units of habitat,
and discussing and critiquing the habitat transaction method and variations on it).
15. See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 368–71
(1986) (suggesting that a concern with maintaining the continuity of a community could support rent
control).
16. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 40 (3d ed. 2005).
17. See id. (posing a hypothetical in which “social welfare would be maximized if all Napa
vineyards were converted en masse to housing development” but “a partial-housing outcome in the
Napa Valley would be even less efficient than an all-vineyard allocation”).
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vineyards ensure that the homeowners have to go a great distance to work
or shop or even visit each other. It is the worst of both worlds. If we
proceeded cautiously by introducing a small grouping of homes into the
vineyard area, the results would be awful.18 It would be similar to building
half a bridge. Changing over the area entirely might be a totally different
story.19 Now there is enough density of housing to support the services and
infrastructure that households need. A whole chunk of vineyard vistas are
lost but this may increase support for keeping another chunk unspoiled
elsewhere.
This example assumes that we are better off moving from all vineyards
to all housing, but the point is a conceptual one that applies regardless of
what the most valuable use might be.20 In places like Detroit where there
are many vacant lots, we might have the reverse story.21 It might be better
for an area that is now residential to be given over to some low-intensity
use such as parkland. But it probably doesn’t work out well to do this
piecemeal. Vacant lots interspersed with occupied houses do not a good
parkland make.22 The point goes back to co-location: Parkland may be most
useful when co-located with other parkland. The value of animal habitats,
open vistas, and agricultural uses likewise depend on the scale at which
they exist. It follows that changes must be made at the right scale, if they
are to be made at all.

18. And, in fact, such intermediate steps might not ever occur. See id. (explaining that on the
assumptions given, “landowners might not be able to bargain their way away from the status quo”
because, for example, “neighboring vintners would be able to offer the first-arriving housing developer
enough to stop the developer’s incremental introduction of housing into the vineyards”).
19. Yet, without some form of coordination, this result may never occur. See id. (“Although a
complete shift to the all-housing outcome would be efficient, market forces would tend to stymie any
first steps in that direction.”).
20. The economic term given to the general issue is “nonconvexities in production
possibilities.” See id.; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 170–73 &
figs.5.5 & 5.7 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining and depicting this principle). At a broader level of generality,
the point is one about complementarities—the capacity for particular combinations of uses (whether all
of a given use, as in the examples above, or an optimal mix of different uses) to generate greater value
than other combinations would generate.
21. See, e.g., John Gallagher, With So Much Space, So Few Options—Detroit’s Vast Vacant
Lots Are a Burden, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 1, 2012), http://archive.freep.com/article/20120401/
NEWS01/204010467/With-so-much-space-so-few-options-Detroit-s-vast-vacant-lots-are-a-burden.
22. See, e.g., SMART GROWTH PROGRAM, OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE CMTYS., U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, MANAGING VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTY IN THE GREEN ZONE OF
SAGINAW, MICHIGAN 8–10 (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/sgia/SaginawSGIA-Report-Final-071614.pdf (discussing possible ways to use vacant land, including uses that require
assembling multiple contiguous parcels).
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C. Conflict Matters Too
People’s preferences about co-location often conflict: Each choice
about co-location rules out many other preferred co-location possibilities.
And the most interesting and difficult land use conflicts come down to
chunk versus chunk: community or highway, shopping district or habitat,
cohesive historic neighborhood or affordable housing in close proximity to
workplaces. Which chunk should win out? In part, the answer may depend
on whether one chunk is easier to move than another, or loses less value
when divided up than another. But the central point I want to make is that
we cannot avoid these conflicts, and that we will do better at resolving them
if we recognize more clearly what is at stake.
To take a very simple example, suppose there is a neighborhood that is
also a good place for a highway. We focus, quite appropriately, on the
displacement that would occur as a result of building the highway.23
Sometimes we also focus on the newly placed highway, which may have
negative spillovers for the remaining neighbors.24 But there is another
effect, which I call unplacement, which simply comes from breaking up the
old neighborhood and leaving only a portion of it behind.25
This leads to the counterintuitive thought that what may be most
disturbing about eminent domain and gentrification is not that they displace
people, but rather that they break apart a cohesive unit. Community is
destroyed precisely because it is divided up, with some displaced and some
remaining in a place that has been greatly changed. This suggests
something interesting: that the damage associated with certain land use
23. Indeed, concerns about displacement may shape decisions about where to locate highways.
See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV.
101, 110–21 (2006) (using the placement of Chicago’s expressways as a potential illustration of the
principle that governments will avoid taking high subjective value property that is important to a tightknit community, if the community has sufficient political power).
24. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV.
277, 279–81, 290–94 (2001) (defining “derivative takings” as “externalities produced by takings” and
arguing that they should be compensated).
25. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky’s notion of “derivative takings” could be cast
broadly enough to reach these costs. See Garnett, supra note 23, at 119 (describing “derivative takings”
as including impacts such as “noise, fumes, physical separation from their neighbors, [and] decreased
property values” attributable to nearby condemnations) (citing Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 559 (2001)). For a good illustration of how breaking up a community can
reduce the subjective value that homeowners have in their homes, see Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter
Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV.
75, 113–24 (2004) (discussing the role of “community externalities” in precluding holdout behavior and
facilitating a power company’s acquisition of a small town). See also Garnett, supra note 23, at 119–20
(describing losses to communities that occurred when expressways cut through parish boundaries).
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changes may depend in part on the scale at which the displacement occurs
and whether relocation is undertaken to preserve the relative position of
people and uses. This is not to suggest that the harm of displacement can be
avoided by simply displacing more people. What it does mean, though, is
that what might seem on the surface to be the least harmful eminent domain
policy, that of displacing as few families as possible, may appear artificially
cheap to the government because it doesn’t account for the breaking apart
of synergies that are together generating value.26
Displacement and unplacement are not the only ways that co-location
is disrupted, however. There is a third problem, which I’ll call
nonplacement.27 These are the co-locations that cannot happen because of
existing patterns of ownership and occupancy. This problem is easily
illustrated by the party of eight that arrives at a restaurant and cannot be
seated together because the only available seats are in scattered two-person
tables. Other examples include households that can’t locate near their
preferred school because no affordable options exist, businesses that can’t
locate near enough each other to generate adequate foot traffic, and animals
who can’t locate together in habitats large enough to sustain populations.
If we focus only on displacement and unplacement, we are implicitly
privileging current possession—granting priority to those who happen to be
in place in the present moment, and disregarding the interests of those who
didn’t get that opportunity, or who lost that opportunity long ago to the
people presently on site.28 Property and land use law does often privilege
getting there first (this was the theme of a recent Williams lecture by Joseph
Sax),29 and we have all heard that possession is nine-tenths of the law.30
There may be psychological reasons to favor letting those who are in place
26. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1064–65 (2008) (criticizing a “minimalist” approach of taking as little as
possible through eminent domain on the grounds that it breaks up cohesive assets and diminishes the
value of the remainder).
27. This idea relates to the claim that there is an insufficient amount of land assembly. See,
e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1497 (2008)
(referencing “the social waste that comes from underassembly of land”). Although it is a difficult
empirical question whether we have too little land assembly, it is certainly the case that existing
configurations can block new configurations and that they therefore carry an opportunity cost.
28. There may be reasons to engage in just such privileging in some instances. See Radin,
supra note 15, at 368–71. But we should be clear about what we are doing.
29. Joseph L. Sax, The Property Rights Sweepstakes: Has Anyone Held the Winning Ticket?,
34 VT. L. REV. 157, 163–71 (2009) (comparing space-based and time-based systems of appropriation
and observing the ways in which our system embodies the latter).
30. For a recent critical exploration of this adage, see Carol M. Rose, The Law Is Nine-Tenths
of Possession: An Adage Turned on Its Head, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien
Chang ed., forthcoming 2015), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2435329.
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hang onto what they have, but those considerations do not automatically
trump all other interests.31 We can and should pay attention to
nonplacement as well as displacement and unplacement.
Making these tradeoffs should cause land use regulators and planners
to consider questions of permanence and portability. Which uses absolutely
must stay put? Which uses can move? A focus on co-location refines this
inquiry.
III. POLICY DIRECTIONS
So what does a focus on co-location tell us about land use and housing
going forward? I started this talk with the bold claim that this slight change
in perspective could be transformative. How so? I have three points that I
hope will provide some food for thought. First, thinking about co-location
changes our understanding of what counts as housing policy. Second, it
prompts us to think more creatively about coordinating uses. Third, it
pushes us to plan for change over time in a more conscious manner.
A. Reimagining the Boundaries of Housing Policy
Here it is helpful to observe that “housing” is an inexact term for a
bundle of services that people regularly or episodically seek in their
homes—not just shelter, privacy, and storage, but also facilities for childrearing, pet care, meal production and consumption, personal hygiene and
clothing maintenance, recreation and exercise, education and work, guest
accommodation, event hosting, and more.32 Because many of these
functions can be fulfilled outside the home, in whole or part, choosing a
home entails determining the scope or domain of the home—what functions
it will serve.33 The quality and availability of public or private services
outside the home that can fulfill these functions will bear on this decision.
We don’t normally think of preserving land for public parks or zoning for
laundromats as constituting housing policy, but we should. Services and
amenities that are co-located near the private spaces used as homes can alter
what it is that we need housing to do, and this in turn can affect what sorts
31. For a critical perspective on the costs of displacement from the home, see, for example,
Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1093, 1115–19 (2009).
32. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property in Housing, 12 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 31, 34–35,
61–64 (2013), available at http://publication.iias.sinica.edu.tw/61602121.pdf; Benjamin Barros, Home
as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 259–75 (2006).
33. See Fennell, supra note 32, at 51–71.
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of housing alternatives the law permits, encourages, forbids, or
discourages.34
There have been recent experiments in several U.S. cities with microapartments, including some units with the square footage of a single
parking space.35 Housing density and affordability could be enhanced with
these spaces, but questions arise about whether they are too small to
provide an appropriate habitat for a human being.36 There are even more
extreme examples, such as the capsule hotels in Japan that have sometimes
gone beyond the function of a place to sleep to serve as a more or less longterm home.37 Whether this seems like a clever alternative or a bad idea
depends a lot on how the housing unit will be used: Just how many hours a
day do you plan to stay in there?
Another way to ask the question, following the theme of this talk, is to
ask what housing-related services are co-located with your apartment. Are
there nearby parks and gyms for recreation and exercise? Are there places
to work, read, do laundry, socialize, garden, and so on? Are there nearby
facilities for hosting parties and putting up guests? Housing policy can
support microunits by supporting these kinds of services and more. By
making related facilities and services easier to access and share outside the
home (whether through government provision, subsidization, or simply the
loosening of land use controls), housing can become more affordable.38 The
point extends far beyond the viability of microapartments to encompass
questions about the size of suburban lots, the density of housing
development, and the overall spatial layout of a metropolitan area. The less

34. See id. at 56–57 (explaining that the space necessary for a residence depends on which
activities occur within the home and which are obtained externally).
35. See, e.g., Tim Iglesias, The Promises and Pitfalls of Micro-Housing, ZONING AND
PLANNING LAW REPORT, Nov. 2014, at 1; Rebecca Burns, Multistorey Car Park in US Transformed
GUARDIAN
(July
9,
2014,
4:51
AM),
into
Designer
Micro-Apartments,
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jul/09/multistorey-car-park-us-designer-micro-apartmentsaffordable-housing.
36. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 35, at 5. For a discussion of the regulation of microunits in
several U.S. cities, see generally John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges
for Micro-Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53 (2014).
37. See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, For Some in Japan, Home Is a Tiny Plastic Bunk, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/business/global/02capsule.html.
38. A similar point has been recognized in the context of common interest communities, where
residents share common amenities such as swimming pools and tennis courts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, ch. 6, introductory note (2000) (noting that one reason for the
popularity of common interest communities is “their ability to increase the amenities available to
residents by providing a workable mechanism for sharing enjoyment and spreading the costs across a
stable base of contributors”).
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one needs one’s home to do, the less it is likely to cost. Making policy that
is informed by co-location can foster affordability.
To make this point concrete, consider some recent data that has been
collected on where people run within cities.39 It turns out that people like to
run next to water, as well as in parks.40 Water, at least, is hard to move. We
might not normally think about the trails surrounding water as housing
policy, but we should. Housing in close proximity to those trails is housing
that does not have to do as much work in containing the exercise regimen
within the four corners of the home or apartment complex. Thinking
carefully about what uses are complementary to what other uses, and which
uses are easy or hard to move, can alter the way we approach problems of
housing and housing affordability.
Co-location-conscious policies can also change the spatial footprint of
an area and alter the amount of space (and energy) that each household
must consume. If one’s home must accommodate a wide range of functions,
it must be sized for the largest of those functions. Thus, the desire to
entertain a large number of guests twice a year or put up the in-laws for a
few weekends each year can impact the size of people’s year-round
dwelling units.41 The house itself cannot expand and contract as needed.
But external facilities that serve some of the same purposes can effectively
add elasticity. A nearby shared guesthouse could add extra capacity for
household guests,42 and shared event venues can make it unnecessary to
place grand entertaining spaces within one’s home.43 People could still
choose to include those spaces in their homes, of course, but housing policy
could make it feasible to do otherwise.
39. Nathan Yau, Where People Run in Major Cities, FLOWING DATA,
http://flowingdata.com/2014/02/05/where-people-run/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
40. Id. (“If there’s one quick (and expected) takeaway, it’s that people like to run by the water
and in parks . . . .”).
41. Fennell, supra note 32, at 58–59.
42. See Lucy Sargisson, Second-Wave Cohousing: A Modern Utopia?, 23 UTOPIAN STUD. 28,
41 (2012) (explaining that cohousing residences can be smaller than conventional residences because,
“[f]or example, if a community has a shared guesthouse, there is no need for each home to contain a
guest room”).
43. Clubhouses and other amenities in common interest communities may serve this purpose.
See, e.g., Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other
Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 205 (1992)
(suggesting common interest communities may respond to perceived governmental shortfalls, including
those in “amenities such as parks, swimming pools, and clubhouses”); see also Mark Fenster,
Community by Covenant, Process, and Design: Cohousing and the Contemporary Common Interest
Community, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 3, 11–12 (1999) (describing shared “common houses” in
cohousing developments which allow residents to devote less space in their individual homes to
kitchens, playrooms, laundry facilities, meeting areas, and so on).
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Enabling people to satisfy more functions outside the home also has
some interesting implications for mobility and stability over the life cycle.
In some cases it might mean that changes in the activities, interests, or even
the number of household members will not require a change in residence, if
the need for extra space can be satisfied outside the home. However, it is
possible that more co-located services and facilities could lead to smaller
housing units that are more sensitive to life cycle changes. While a guest
room might have previously been repurposed a half dozen times as a home
office, a music studio, a sewing room, a weight lifting room, a media room,
and a storage space, it now might not be part of the family’s home at all.
Whether people would move more or less often is an open question,
but land use policy can also determine whether it is possible to relocate in a
nearby area.44 If much of what matters is supplied in the community, and
not in the individual house, then moving might be less disruptive than we
typically assume it to be. Some jurisdictions have taken steps to
accommodate accessory dwelling units and “laneway” homes that would
effectively allow people to move into smaller spaces as they age.45
Interestingly, for all the negative press that eminent domain has gotten for
displacing people, there has been scarcely a whisper of attention given to
the fact that land use policy can also profoundly affect how often people
must make voluntary moves due to changes in life circumstances, how far
they must move in such cases, and how disruptive those moves will be.
B. Coordinate (and Coerce) Creatively
Coordinating to achieve better co-location patterns does not mean that
everything has to be planned by the government. Command and control is
just one strategy, and it may not work so well when we are trying to
encourage the sorts of complex, heterogeneous mixes of uses that lead, say,
to a successful urban district. Here, we can take a page from some private
44. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 139 (1961)
(observing that heterogeneous neighborhoods allow people to “stay put” even as their family size and
circumstances change).
45. See, e.g., Laneway Housing Approved by Vancouver Council, CBC NEWS (July 29, 2009,
9:08 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/laneway-housing-approved-by-vancouvercouncil-1.823237 (quoting Vancouver Councillor Raymond Louie’s observation that permitting laneway
garages to be converted to dwelling units will allow people to “age in place . . . and have the opportunity
to stay in that community for the entire duration of their life”); Megan Stewart, Minneapolis Council
Passes ‘Granny–Flats’ Amendment, KSTP TV (Dec. 5, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://kstp.com/article/stories/
s3640387.shtml (reporting on Minneapolis’s amendment permitting self-contained accessory dwelling
units (ADUs) to be added to lots with one- or two-family homes, and permitting either the home or the
ADU to be rented out if the owner occupied the other unit); see also Infranca, supra note 36, at 69–70.
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examples of coordination when we think about how to get the right mix of
land uses and land users.46
For example, legal scholars Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter
Siegelman have recently examined the possibility of making cities operate a
bit more like shopping malls.47 The owner of a shopping mall owns the
entire domain and can maximize profits by attracting anchor stores with
lower rents and charging more rent to lesser-known stores.48 Similarly,
cities could assemble large tracts of land and auction them off to developers
who would coordinate uses.49 Peter Colwell, an economist, once observed
that we could get results similar to optimal zoning if we made developers
hold property in very big chunks, say 640 acres, as long as we had some
rules about what to do around the edges.50
But suppose we don’t want to concentrate ownership in this way.51
Local governments could try to achieve desirable co-location patterns on
their own by using a strategy of adjusting prices for different land uses,
much like universities might use merit scholarships to lower the price for
students they especially want to attract.52 There’s a problem, though—local
governments don’t exactly “sell” zoning or permission to develop, at least

46. See, e.g., Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 658–61.
47. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive
Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2012).
48. See, e.g., id. at 241–45; B. Peter Pashigian & Eric D. Gould, Internalizing Externalities:
The Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls, 41 J.L. & ECON. 115, 122–25 (1998).
49. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 47, at 247–57 (proposing such an approach, as
an alternative to having the government retain ownership of the area itself); Pashigian & Gould, supra
note 48, at 141 (“While this is not a new idea, giving developers the opportunity to develop blocks of
condemned space instead of individual parcels has much to recommend itself because developers will
take account of the externalities among stores.”).
50. Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL EST.
ECON. 525, 529 n.6 (1997).
51. There are reasons we might hesitate to do so. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 10, Part III.B.1
(discussing drawbacks of a “supersizing” approach to land ownership, including internal management
costs, and citing associated literature). The concentration of ownership itself might be independently
problematic, at least if undertaken on a broad scale. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 2061, 2094 (2012) (observing that ownership that is limited to “only a small number of
people” forfeits the benefits of “dispersed local knowledge” and can dampen incentives and reduce
property’s role as a check on power). In addition, the initial assembly of land would likely require the
exercise of eminent domain. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 47, at 218.
52. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 10, Part III.B.3 (discussing differential pricing in the urban
context and citing literature on other examples of such pricing structures); Michael Rothschild &
Lawrence J. White, The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Education and Other Services in Which the
Customers Are Inputs, 103 J. POL. ECON. 573 (1995) (examining higher education and other settings in
which the characteristics of the customers are important to the product).
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not on the open market.53 But they can do other things to make locating in
one area rather than another more or less attractive.
Concert pricing offers an interesting analogy. Concerts (at least certain
kinds) are thought to be better if you have more fans that are leaping around
and hooting and cheering, rather than just passively enjoying the show from
a seated position. But it’s hard to achieve this through ordinary pricing; the
person who might pay the most for a concert ticket might not be the best
audience member.54 The willingness to camp out for tickets or wait in a
long queue might correlate better with enthusiasm.55 And at least some
economists analyzing the situation have posited this is why concert tickets
are priced as low as they are, and why there are efforts to control ticket
scalping.56 Applying this approach to the co-location problem of land use
might mean making certain areas especially attractive to complementary
land uses and land users through infrastructure and amenities.57
When land must be assembled for a new use, coordination may become
impossible, and coercion—eminent domain—may become necessary to
address holdouts.58 Here too, thinking creatively about the problem of colocation may be helpful in minimizing the harms that come from
53. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 2, at 72 & nn.18–23 and sources cited therein. The fact that
zoning rights are not freely alienable has long been criticized. See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 2
(1977); Marion Clawson, Why Not Sell Zoning and Rezoning? (Legally, That Is), CRY CAL., Sept. 23,
1966, at 9, 39.
54. See Allan C. DeSerpa, To Err Is Rational: A Theory of Excess Demand for Tickets, 15
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 511, 515–17 (1994) (presenting a concert pricing model in which “the
highest-demand buyers in terms of money price will generally not be the ‘best audience’ in their own
estimation”).
55. See Lutz-Alexander Busch & Phil Curry, Ticket Pricing and the Impression of Excess
Demand, 111 ECON. LETTERS 40 (2011) (presenting a model for event tickets in which fans of higher
quality have a lower cost of lining up).
56. See id.; DeSerpa, supra note 54.
57. Prior work has analyzed these strategies and noted their potential to become avenues for
discrimination. See GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR
IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 72 (2000) (noting potential for government amenity choice to shape
demographics); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L.
REV. 437 (2006) (analyzing “exclusionary amenities” in private residential communities). These risks
heighten the case for attending to these strategies, which cities may already be employing in
unrecognized ways. See Fennell, supra note 10, Part III.B.3.
58. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 13, at 74–76. Private developers may, however, have
relatively greater ability to assemble land than the government does. See id. at 82 (noting that private
parties may be better able than the government to employ devices that rely on secrecy, such as “buying
agents, option agreements, [and] straw transactions”); Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement
in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 20–24 (2006) (expanding on this theme). Alternatives to traditional eminent domain might also
be pursued. See generally, e.g., Heller & Hills, supra note 27 (proposing “land assembly districts”).
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displacement. Certainly governmental entities should be sensitive to the fact
that condemnation often involves breaking up complementary uses, even as
it often attempts to make possible new complementary chunks of value. But
the concept of co-location opens up another possibility that deserves
discussion: If what matters most is not one’s absolute position on a map,
but rather one’s relative position to other land uses and land users, it is
possible to craft policies that lead to less destructive forms of displacement.
To make this concrete: Involuntary moves are likely to be less
disruptive if a lot of what matters to the individual remains accessible,
either in its original location or in a shifted location. Other countries
employ systems of land readjustment that redevelop areas and give those
who are displaced a new piece of property in the same area that is equally
or more valuable (in fair market value terms, at least).59 This approach has
not received much attention in the United States, perhaps because of an
assumption that being shifted to a new (and probably smaller) location
could never add value. Yet that assumption may itself be founded on the
mistaken perception that what gives a particular property its value is found
within the four corners of that property. We know that isn’t true. The ability
to place more of what is valuable outside the home could make moving less
painful.
One might object, however, that the problem with eminent domain is
not what the household loses, but rather the fact it was forced to give up its
property at all.60 It is clearly better to have changes in land uses be
consensual, not forced, but that goal can be at odds with the broad
participation required to make chunky changes. This brings us to the third
policy direction: that we make it possible for people to opt for less
permanence.
C. Planning for Impermanence
Recognizing that breaking up or relocating existing co-located uses
may be necessary to produce new and better forms of co-location suggests a
role for planned portability of at least some uses. What if a city were
designed a little more like an art gallery, with permanent exhibits and
59. See generally ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE
ACTION (Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie Needham eds., 2007).
60. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957,
966–67 (2004) (noting eminent domain’s interference with the owner’s autonomy in deciding when and
whether to sell); Garnett, supra note 23, at 109–10 (discussing “dignitary harms” that may come from
eminent domain).
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rotating ones? The permanent exhibits give the place an enduring character,
but planning for a certain amount of rotation can generate energy and foster
flexibility. The increasing use of pop-up retail shops or event venues
illustrates some of the potential. In addition to energizing already thriving
urban areas, such temporary uses can serve as a means of innovation and
redevelopment in areas with sizable amounts of empty or underutilized
land.61 At an even smaller scale, food trucks represent flexible,
reconfigurable bits of urban life.62
The overriding notion is one of reversible land use choices. Virtually
all land use choices are reversible at some cost, but those costs often appear
prohibitive, and produce a kind of path dependence or stickiness in the way
that land (or more precisely, space) is used as a resource.63 Planning for
portability from the outset can counter this stickiness. Here we might draw
lessons from large-scale events like Olympic Games and World Fairs,
which often involve dramatic changes in land use, some that are meant to
be temporary and others that are meant to leave a more lasting signature on
the place.64 If it is possible to plan for portability in these contexts, why not
in others?
Property rights represent one impediment.65 How can we plan for
flexibility and impermanence in a world where property rights are typically
61. These approaches are beginning to receive attention from policymakers and commentators.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Temporary Urbanism: Alternative Approaches to
Vacant Land, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Winter 2014), http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/em/
winter14/highlight4.html; Stacy Cowley, How Pop-Up Stores Are Spurring Innovation in Detroit, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/how-pop-up-stores-are-spurringinnovation-in-detroit/.
62. Food trucks’ increasing popularity has spawned research to quantify the trend and identify
the underlying dynamics. See Diane Swanbrow, Study Identifies Factors that Contribute to Food
Trucks’ Fast Spread, UNIV. OF MICH. NEWS (Aug. 16, 2014), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/22337study-identifies-factors-that-contribute-to-food-trucks-fast-spread (reporting on the work of Todd
Schifeling and Daphne Demetry, who “found that there are now more than 4,000 food trucks in U.S.
cities with more than 100,000 people”).
63. See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservation of Privately
Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RES. J. 573, 590–99 (2004) (examining the physical and institutional costs and
impediments to reversing different kinds of decisions about development and conservation).
64. See, e.g., Brandon Smith, The Future of Olympic Architecture Is Portable, MASHABLE
(July 31, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/31/olympic-architecture/. By mentioning these examples
of planned portability, I do not mean to suggest that all land use actions surrounding such mega-events
are benign or appropriate. On the contrary, concerns about displacement loom large. See, e.g., Jessica
Blumert, Note, Home Games: Legal Issues Concerning the Displacement of Property Owners at the Site
of Olympic Venues, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153 (2012); Solomon J. Greene, Note, Staged
Cities: Mega-Events, Slum Clearance, and Global Capital, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 161 (2003).
My discussion here is aimed at finding ways to reduce displacement by planning ahead for change.
65. See Eamonn D’Arcy & Geoffrey Keogh, Towards a Property Market Paradigm of Urban
Change, 29 ENV’T & PLANNING A 685, 691 (1997) (observing that the property rights bound up in the
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perpetual in length? Here we might take a page from finance. Some
financial instruments are callable by design; investors are willing to
purchase them because the price reflects the risk that the call will be
exercised.66 Would Americans ever go for “callable” homes? In one sense,
we already have. The government has a call option on your home that
enables it to acquire the property for public use at fair market value.67 What
is interesting to consider is whether people would willingly purchase in
communities that are designed to be reconfigurable or even portable.
Because such purchases would increase land use flexibility, it would be
worth subsidizing this choice. If people who are more amenable to moving
can signal this fact to the government, resort to eminent domain might
become less necessary.68
Such an alternative might become more attractive if it were coupled
with efforts to ensure that physical displacement from one’s precise current
location does not mean losing the important elements of co-location one
presently enjoys in the larger community. If moving doesn’t mean giving
up the park where you take walks, the gym where you exercise, the coffee
shop where you write your novel, the school or day care your kids attend, or
the dog park where you exercise your pup, it takes on a different cast than if
your life is simply upended.
Consider this analogy: Increasingly, people use their computers not to
archive huge amounts of data but rather to access online storage areas in
“the cloud.”69 It is easy to see the advantage. As more of the things you do
on the computer are saved in the cloud, the less of a big deal it is to change
computers or devices. What is most valuable to you is still there in the
existing stock of buildings, as well as the buildings themselves, constitute “potentially important
constraints on urban change”).
66. See, e.g., High-Yield CDs—Protect Your Money by Checking the Fine Print, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/certific.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (describing
callable certificates of deposit, which the issuing bank can terminate at its option).
67. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1972) (observing that a
home is only protected by a “liability rule” against the government’s acquisition through eminent
domain, meaning that the government can proceed unilaterally upon paying a specified price). Legal
scholars have adopted the language of options as a way of talking about liability rules. See IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 14–17 (2005); Madeline Morris, The
Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 852 (1993) (noting that a call option is an
illustration of a liability rule).
68. The idea of enabling residents to opt into arrangements that are less permanent or rooted is
one I will be developing further in future work. For a brief overview, see Fennell, supra note 10, Part
III.B.5.
69. See, e.g., Jill Duffy, The Best Cloud Storage Solutions, PC MAG. (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2413556,00.asp.
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cloud. Might we come to think about houses and businesses in this same
way? The logic of co-location suggests we might. If what is valuable
remains accessible within the community, changes in location could
become less threatening.
CONCLUSION
These are, as I said, just ideas meant to spur further thought and
discussion. Whether or not any of them resonate with you, I hope I have
convinced you that co-location matters, and that it can change the way we
think about land use and housing.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Lee Anne Fennell
University of Chicago Law School
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

The University of Chicago Law School
Kreisman Working Papers on Housing Law and Policy
For a listing of papers, please go to http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/housing_law_and_policy

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Lee Anne Fennell and Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, December 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, November 2013
Neil Bhutta and Benjamin J. Keys, Interest Rates and Equity Extraction during the
Housing Boom, January 2014
Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison, Tomasz Piskorski, and Arpit Gupta, Mortgage
Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with
Countrywide, January 2014
Edward R. Morrison, Coasean Bargaining in Consumer Bankruptcy, January 2014
Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real
Economy, January 2014
Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Tomasz
Piskorski, and Amit Seru, Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the
Home Affordable Modification Program, August 2012
Sumit Agarwal, Effi Benmelech, Nittai Bergman, and Amit Seru, Did the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? November 2012
Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, and James Witkin, Asset Quality Misrepresentation by
Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market, February 2013
Umit G. Gurun, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru, Advertising Expensive Mortgages,
March 2013
Benjamin J. Keys, Devin G. Pope, and Jaren C. Pope, Failure to Refinance, August 2014
Adam B. Badawi and Anthony J. Casey, The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts through the
Corporate Lens, March 2014
Lee Anne Fennell, Property in Housing, March 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Just Enough, August 2013
Yun-chien Chang and Lee Anne Fennell, Partition and Revelation, April 2014
Robert J. Chaskin and Mark L. Joseph, Contested Space: Design Principles and
Regulatory Regimes in Mixed-Income Communities Replacing Public Housing
Complexes in Chicago, October 2014
Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, December 2014
Sebastien Gay and Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi, Guarding the Subjective Premium:
Condemnation Risk Discounts in the Housing Market, December 2014
Brian A. Jacob, Max Kapustin, and Jens Ludwig, Human Capital Effects of Anti-Poverty
Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Housing Voucher Lottery, December 2014
Sebastien Gay and Allen T. Zhang, Expertise Value Added in the Real Estate Market,
December 2014
Atif R. Mian and Amir Sufi, Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage
Applications during the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005, February 2015
Sebastien Gay, Investors Effect on Household Real Estate Affordability, May 2015
Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather
Insurance, May 2015
Lee Anne Fennell, Co-Location, Co-Location, Co-Location: Land Use and Housing
Priorities Reimagined, September 2015

The University of Chicago Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series
For a listing of papers 1–400 please go to http://www.law.uchicago.edu/publications/papers/publiclaw.
401.

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

438.

Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker”
American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucauilt’s 1979 Birth of Biopolitics Lectures, September
2012
M. Todd Henderson, Voice versus Exit in Health Care Policy, October 2012
Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but Not Defending) “Unconstitutional” Laws, October 2012
Lee Anne Fennell, Resource Access Costs, October 2012
Brian Leiter, Legal Realisms, Old and New, October 2012
Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lnasberg-Rodriguez, and Mila Versteeg, When to Overthrow Your
Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s Constitutions, November 2012
Brian Leiter and Alex Langlinais, The Methodology of Legal Philosophy, November 2012
Alison L. LaCroix, The Lawyer’s Library in the Early American Republic, November 2012
Alison L. LaCroix, Eavesdropping on the Vox Populi, November 2012
Alison L. LaCroix, On Being “Bound Thereby,” November 2012
Alison L. LaCroix, What If Madison had Won? Imagining a Constitution World of Legislative
Supremacy, November 2012
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Unemployment and Regulatory Policy, December 2012
Alison LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, January 2013
Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, January 2013
Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, February 2013
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, February 2013
Anup Malani and Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, February 2013
Ariel Porat and Lior Strahilevits, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data,
February 2013
Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, February 2013
Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution and the Spending Power, March 2013
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, March 2013
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System? March 2013
Nicholas G. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, March 2013
Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Production of National Security, March 2013
Aziz Z. Huq, Federalism, Liberty, and Risk in NIFB v. Sebelius, April 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Property in Housing, April 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, April 2013
William H. J. Hubbard, An Empiritcal Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum
Shopping in the New York Courts, May 2013
Daniel Abebe and Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, May 2013
Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, June 2013
Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path
Dependence, and Temporary Law, June 2013
Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, June 2013
Bernard Harcourt, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: A Mirror of the History of the
Foundations of Modern Criminal Law, July 2013
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification,
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, July 2013
Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic
Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, July 2013
Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-Economic
Rights as 'Insurance Swaps', August 2013
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle Redux: On Same-Sex Marriage, the
Supreme Court’s Opinion in United States v. Windsor, John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty (1859),
and H.L.A. Hart’s Modern Harm Principle, August 2013
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche against the Philosophical Canon, April 2013

439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

Sital Kalantry, Women in Prison in Argentina: Causes, Conditions, and Consequences, May 2013
Becker and Foucault on Crime and Punishment, A Conversation with Gary Becker, François
Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt: The Second Session, September 2013
Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic Dissonance in
Foreign Affairs, September 2013
Brian Leiter, Why Legal Positivism (Again)? September 2013
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, September 2013
Elizabeth Chorvat, Taxation and Liquidity: Evidence from Retirement Savings, September 2013
Elizabeth Chorvat, Looking Through' Corporate Expatriations for Buried Intangibles, September
2013
William H. J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, March 2015
Tom Ginsburg, Nick Foti, and Daniel Rockmore, “We the Peoples”: The Global Origins of
Constitutional Preambles, March 2014
Lee Anne Fennell and Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, December 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, December 2013
Jose Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism and
Parliamentarism, December 2013
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South after Shelby County, October 2013
Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and Evidentiary Basis of
Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy, November 2013
Tom Ginsburg, Political Constraints on International Courts, December 2013
Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity versus Noninfringement, December 2013
M. Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test of
Congressional Control over Judicial Behavior, January 2014
Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine? January 2014
Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, January 2014
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Voting Rules in International Organizations, January 2014
John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, April 2015
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Roles in Nonjudicial Functions, February
2014
Aziz Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, February 2014
Jennifer Nou, Sub-regulating Elections, February 2014
Albert W. Alschuler, Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy’s Proposal to “Fix”
Skilling v. United States, February 2014
Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, February 2014
Brian Leiter, Preface to the Paperback Edition of Why Tolerate Religion? February 2014
Jonathan S. Masur and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, March 2014
Eric A. Posner, Martii Koskenniemi on Human Rights: An Empirical Perspective, March 2014
Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, Introduction, chapter 1 of Constitutions in Authoritarian
Regimes, April 2014
Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, April 2014
Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, April 2014
Aziz Z. Huq, Coasean Bargaining over the Structural Constitution, April 2014
Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All?
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, May 2014
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to
Criticisms, May 2014
Paige A. Epstein, Addressing Minority Vote Dilution Through State Voting Rights Acts, February
2014
William Baude, Zombie Federalism, April 2014
Albert W. Alschuler, Regarding Re’s Revisionism: Notes on "The Due Process Exclusionary
Rule", May 2014
Dawood I. Ahmed and Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Islamization and Human Rights: The
Surprising Origin and Spread of Islamic Supremacy in Constitutions, May 2014
David Weisbach, Distributionally-Weighted Cost Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets
Organizational Design, June 2014

479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.

William H. J. Hubbard, Nuisance Suits, June 2014
Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, Credible Threats, July 2014
Brian Leiter, The Case Against Free Speech, June 2014
Brian Leiter, Marx, Law, Ideology, Legal Positivism, July 2014
John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, April 2015
Daniel Abebe, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile: The Economics of International Water Law, August
2014
Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions after Mccutcheon, Citizens United, and
SpeechNow, August 2014
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, Comments on Law and Versteeg's “The
Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” August 2014
William H. J. Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero, and Other Metaphors for Litigation, September
2014
Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, September 2014
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction,
October 2014
Thomas J. Miles and Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence
from 'Secure Communities', October 2014
Ariel Porat and Omri Yadlin, A Welfarist Perspective on Lies, May 2015
Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties outside the Courts, October 2014
Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap,
October 2014
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, October 2014
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being and Public Policy,
November 2014
Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, December 2014
Avital Mentovich, Aziz Z. Huq, and Moran Cerf, The Psychology of Corporate Rights, December
2014
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics,
January 2015
Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance,
May 2015
Adam M. Samaha and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Don't Ask, Must Tell—and Other Combinations,
January 2015
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, January 2015
Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of Bribery Make Things
Worse, January 2015
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigovian State, February 2015
Richard H. McAdams, Vengeance, Complicity and Criminal Law in Othello, February 2015
Richard H. McAdams, Dhammika Dharmapala, and Nuno Garoupa, The Law of Police, February
2015
William Baude, Sharing the Necessary and Proper Clause, November 2014
William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause, December 2014
William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket, January 2015
Lee Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity, February 2015
Steven Douglas Smith, Michael B. Rappaport, William Baude, and Stephen E. Sachs, The New
and Old Originalism: A Discussion, February 2015
Alison L. LaCroix, A Man For All Treasons: Crimes By and Against the Tudor State in the Novels
of Hilary Mantel, February 2015
Alison L. LaCroix, Continuity in Secession: The Case of the Confederate Constitution, February
2015
Adam S. Chilton and Eric A. Posner, The Influence of History on States’ Compliance with Human
Rights Obligations, March 2015
Brian Leiter, Reply to Five Critics of Why Tolerate Religion? August 2014
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Teaching Election Law, September 2014

516.

517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.

Susan Nevelow Mart and Tom Ginsburg, [Dis-]Informing the People's Discretion: Judicial
Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, November
2014
Brian Leiter, The Paradoxes of Public Philosophy, November 2014
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Eric McGhee, and Steven Rogers, The Realities of Electoral Reform,
January 2015
Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-Legislature,
January 2015
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, January 2015
Lee Anne Fennell, Do Not Cite or Circulate, February 2015
Aziz Z. Huq, The Difficulties of Democratic Mercy, March 2015
Aziz Z. Huq, Agency Slack and the Design of Criminal Justice Institutions, March 2015
Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, March 2015
Zachary Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, March 2015
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, March 2015
Brian Leiter, Normativity for Naturalists, March 2015
Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, April 2015
Adam S. Chilton and Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness Of Panel Assignment in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, December 2014
Anthony J. Casey and Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, February 2015
G. Mitu Gulati and Richard A. Posner, The Management of Staff by Federal Court of Appeals
Judges, April 2015
Daniel Telech and Brian Leiter, Nietzsche and Moral Psychology, April 2015
Adam S. Chilton, Using Experiments to Test the Effectiveness of Human Rights Treaties, June
2015
Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Strahilevitz, Surveillance Duration Doesn't Affect Privacy
Expectations: An Empirical Test of the Mosaic Theory, August 2015
Caroline A. Wong, Sued If You Do, Sued If You Don’t: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a
Defense to Race-Conscious Districting, April 2015
Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, August 2015
Richard H. McAdams, Riley's Less Obvious Tradeoff: Forgoing Scope-Limited Searches, August
2015
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and Bayesian Cost-Benefit Analysis,
August 2015
Richard H. McAdams, Empathy and Masculinity in Harper Lee's to Kill a Mockingbird August
2015
Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, August 2015
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Mila Versteeg, The Contours of Constitutional Approval, August
2015
Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, August 2015
Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Will Immigrants Cooperate with
Local Police Who Enforce Federal Immigration Law?, September 2015
Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, September 2015
Eric Posner, Presidential Leadership and the Separation of Powers, September 2015
Eric Posner, Should Human Rights Law Play a Role in Development?, September 2015
Lee Anne Fennell, Co-Location, Co-Location, Co-Location: Land Use and Housing Priorities
Reimagined, September 2015

